Investigation by investigative journalism outlet IStories (EN version by OCCRP) shows that Telegram uses a single, FSB-linked company as their infrastructure provider globally.
Telegram’s MTProto protocol also requires a cleartext identifier to be prepended to all client-server messages.
Combined, these two choices by Telegram make it into a surveillance tool.
I am quoted in the IStories story. I also did packet captures, and I dive into the nitty-gritty technical details on my blog.
Packet captures and MTProto deobfuscation library I wrote linked therein so that others can retrace my steps and check my work.
There were reports (claims I suppose) that the fsb were using telegram to organise the stochastic gig job sabotage across Europe.
Joining a neo fash telegram group, pretending to be a rich neo fash who wants to help the cause but not risk themselves and paying people for putting up posters, damaging equipment etc.
Does what has been found here shed any more light on that? I’d guess it would allow them to find these groups to target them very easily? That was the bit I couldn’t quite understand from the original report, if so this all makes more sense.
No no, reports: https://www.msn.com/en-in/news/world/russia-uses-telegram-to-recruit-spies-and-saboteurs-in-europe/ar-AA1xshqO
Not really/not directly, I would say. What you are describing is FSB using Telegram for recruitment. That does not require network-level observability and surveillance. That’s a different “feature”, so to speak.
It’s not that I don’t believe them, but anything coming from spooks has to be looked at a little sideways.
Thanks for the reply. I just couldn’t figure out how they had enough intelligence to find all these telegram groups, maybe that’s easier for a nation state than I thought.
It’s trivial for a nation state, they have lists of these groups. These groups are promoted in other groups and other channels and other forums and eventually reach somebody who will make a note of them.